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DEFINING PRIMARY RESIDENCE:
SOMETIMES IT REALLY IS AS SIMPLE AS
THE PLAIN AND ORDINARY MEANING OF
THE WORD
JUSTINE V. BEYDA1
INTRODUCTION
"This court is not condemning respondent to a life of
homelessness. Whether by choice or circumstance,
respondent is already homeless."1
Michael Tsitsires was not in fact homeless until July of 2005,
when the Civil Court of New York evicted him from his one and
only home of thirty-five years for failing to use the apartment as
his primary residence, despite recognizing that Tsitsires
possessed no other residence.2 This decision was a striking
departure from case law, legislative history, and common sense.
The statutory primary residence requirement allows for the
removal of rent regulation protection from any housing
accommodation that is not the primary residence of the tenant in
possession-upon application by the landlord.' Essentially, this
statute allows a landlord to seek eviction of a rent-regulated
t Editor-in-Chief, St. John's Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2010, St. John's
University School of Law; B.A., 2007, State University of New York at Binghamton
University.
TOA Constr. Co. v. Tsitsires, 9 Misc. 3d 469, 471, 798 N.Y.S.2d 674, 677 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 2005), rev'd per curiam, 14 Misc. 3d 65, 830 N.Y.S.2d 16 (Sup.
Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 2006), rev'd, 54 A.D.3d 109, 861 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1st Dep't 2008).
2 See id. at 493, 798 N.Y.S.2d at 692. The Supreme Court Appellate Term
reversed the finding of non-primary residence on the grounds that the tenant
possessed only one residence, which was per se his primary residence. See TOA
Constr., 14 Misc. 3d at 67, 830 N.Y.S.2d at 18. The Appellate Division reversed the
Appellate Term and awarded possession to the landlord on non-primary residence
grounds. See TOA Constr., 54 A.D.3d at 117-18, 861 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
' See Ch. 373, § 1, 1971 N.Y. Laws 1164.
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tenant upon a showing that the housing unit is not used as the
tenant's primary residence. Prior to the landmark case of TOA
Construction Co. v. Tsitsires,4 however, a court has never, in the
forty years since New York enacted the primary residence
statute, made a finding of non-primary residence when a tenant
has undisputedly possessed only one residence. The court's
decision raises the following question: Does the primary
residence requirement permit the eviction of a tenant from what
is undisputedly his only residence on the grounds that he does
not maintain it as his primary residence?
This question concerning primary residence law is
particularly prone to conflicting viewpoints and great debate
because there is no statutory definition of what exactly a
"primary residence" is. Rather, the definition of the phrase, as
used in New York's rent regulation statutes and codes, has
developed entirely from judicial interpretation. There are,
however, general principles inherent in the plain language of the
statutes and the legislative purpose in creating them that
establish the permissible bounds of the statutes' application and
scope. These include a focus on helping actual residents of New
York attain affordable housing and a reliance on objective
evidence to make primary residence determinations. Most
importantly, the New York legislature objectively demonstrated
an intent to limit the scope of the primary residence requirement
to tenants who possess more than one residence.
This limitation has been recognized by courts applying the
statute that have refused to evict tenants who possess only one
residence on primary residence grounds despite extremely
limited usage of these apartments by the tenants in possession
because it is clear that these tenants do not maintain the
contested apartment for "less than [a] need for a place to call
home."5  Moreover, the legislature recognized that fairness
demanded hesitancy in application of the statutes to tenants who
utilize their apartments in nontraditional ways but clearly do not
do so with profiteering motives. Conversely, subjecting tenants
with more than one residence to the loss of rent regulation
protection-and, therefore, the loss of reduced rent rates-
4 54 A.D.3d 109, 861 N.Y.S.2d 335.
5 See infra Part II; see also Park S. Assocs. v. Mason, 123 Misc. 2d 750, 753, 474
N.Y.S.2d 672, 675 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1984), affd per curiam, 126 Misc. 2d
945, 488 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1984).
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seemed implicitly fair when those tenants were affluent enough
to concurrently maintain at least two residences. Accordingly,
while courts have discretion in making primary residence
determinations, an interpretation of the New York rent
regulation statutes that permits a finding of non-primary
residence when it is uncontested that a tenant has only one
residence cannot be reconciled with the plain language of the
statutes, legislative history, public policy, or case precedent.
Consistent with this assertion, no court, until TOA
Construction, has found that a tenant's undisputedly only
housing accommodation was not his primary residence, nor
explicitly stated that proving at least two residences was not an
essential element of the primary residence test. Acceptance of
this interpretation of the primary residence requirement has
serious ramifications and is a matter of vital importance for the
residents of the nearly 1.4 million rent-regulated housing units
in New York City.' If the possession of at least two housing units
is not an essential element of the primary residence test, a
whole new category of tenant, never previously considered a
target for primary residence claims, may face eviction on
these grounds. More importantly, the ultimate effect of
subjecting this new category of tenant-who maintains only one
residence-to eviction is to allow, and even foster, judicially
imposed homelessness.
Furthermore, when a tenant undisputedly possesses only
one residence, the legislative mandate that primary residence
determinations must rest on objective criteria is not met.
Codifying this mandate, New York's current rent regulation
guidelines suggest four non-determinative criteria to be used to
assess primary residence claims, three of which are objective
criteria and one of which is subjective.7 The first two focus on
documentary evidence of the address a tenant uses on certain
documents. These two criteria explicitly ask if the tenant lists an
address other than the contested apartment on these documents,8
which would clearly demonstrate which of at least two residences
a tenant considered his primary home. This inquiry also
6 See N.Y. CITY RENT GUIDELINES BD., 2008 HOUSING SUPPLY REPORT
3, available at http://www.housingnyc.com/downloads/research/pdf reports/ 08HSR.
pdf.
See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
See infra note 31 and accompanying text
2009]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
explicitly reveals that the New York legislature viewed
possession of at least two residences as a condition precedent to
an assessment of primary residence. The fourth criterion focuses
on proof of subletting. It is highly unlikely for a tenant to opt to
become homeless by subletting his or her only residence;
therefore, this criterion also relies on objective proof that a
tenant sublets, which most likely also demonstrates that the
tenant possess at least two housing accommodations. The only
subjective criterion asks whether a tenant spent at least 183
days in the dwelling in the year preceding the litigation.9 When
tenants have only one residence, which they do not sublet, courts
are forced to make the primary residence determination based
exclusively on the one subjective criterion of the rent regulation
guidelines because the first two are rendered inapplicable when
there are no other addresses to compare-the fourth is
inapplicable without proof of subletting. A tenant's fate (facing
eviction on non-primary residence grounds) in this situation
turns, therefore, on the manner and length of time in which he, a
rent-paying tenant, utilizes the one residence that he owns. This
inquiry contradicts the legislative demand for objective evidence
and implicates constitutional infringements on privacy and due
process. It also raises credibility issues by relying exclusively on
subjective determinations of how much is enough to constitute
"truly living" in one's home. Additionally, the subjective nature
of the 183-day requirement exacerbates the predictability
problems of a statute already criticized for producing arbitrary
results. °
This Note argues that proving the existence of two
residences is, and has always been, a necessary element of a
landlord's prima facie case when seeking eviction of a rent-
regulated tenant on non-primary residence grounds. Part I of
this Note describes the statutes and regulations that establish
9 See infra note 31 and accompanying text. The 183-day usage requirement
lacks objectivity in both its creation and its application. The decision that 183 days
is adequate usage of an apartment to constitute a person's primary residence is a
subjective decision of appropriate usage. Additionally, the evidence used to assess
whether a tenant meets this requirement will often come from testimonial evidence
of the tenant and his neighbors, which can hardly be considered objective in nature.
1o See Paul A. Batista, Primary Residence: The Law the Conflict and the Future,
N.Y. L.J., Sept. 11, 1985, at 1 ("Despite the explosion of 'primary residence'
litigation, few guidelines have emerged for establishing basic rules or predicting the
outcome of particular cases.").
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the primary residence requirement in rent-regulated housing
units and describes two irreconcilable interpretations of the
proper primary residence test. This Part will also highlight the
recent and controversial case of TOA Construction Co. v. Tsitsires
that raises many issues, including those concerning public policy
and prior case law, which are relevant to the discussion of which
is the proper test to be used in making primary residence
determinations. This Note, however, is not limited to a
discussion of this case, but instead raises issues not discussed in
TOA Construction in an attempt to determine the proper
interpretation of the primary residence standard. Part II will
evaluate the competing interpretations of the primary residence
test against the plain language of the statutes, legislative history
and purpose, public policy, and prior judicial interpretation. Part
III concludes that an interpretation of the primary residence
statutes that does not recognize the possession of two residences
as a necessary element of the primary residence test is an
improper interpretation of the statute. An interpretation of this
nature skews the intended legislative scope of the requirement
and leads to illogical results.
I. PRIMARY RESIDENCE LAW: HISTORY, PURPOSE, AND JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION
This Part will explore the statutory and judicial history of
the primary residence requirement. Part I.A. will discuss the
statutory framework and regulations that create, but do not
define, the primary residence requirement for rent-regulated
housing units in New York. Part I.B. will explore the legislative
purpose in adding a primary residence requirement to the rent
regulation scheme already in existence at that time. Part I.C.
will describe the judicial interpretation of these statutes by
highlighting the seminal cases in this area, which are frequently
accredited with creating a judicial definition of the statutorily
undefined phrase "primary residence." Finally, Part I.D. will
discuss the landmark case TOA Construction, which highlights
some, but not all, of the issues in determining whether the
legislature intended that a tenant could be subjected to the loss
of rent regulation protection-essentially allowing eviction-on a
non-primary residence claim when that dwelling is the tenant's
only residence.
20091 909
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A. The Statutory Framework
The rent regulation system1 is designed to protect tenants
from unreasonable evictions and rent increases, while
simultaneously giving landlords a fair rate of compensation. 12
Under the system, the risk of unreasonable eviction is far less
than in a traditional lease because tenants subject to rent
regulation protection are entitled to possession of their rent-
regulated apartment indefinitely, as long as they make the
required rent payments and are in compliance with the rent
regulation laws and regulations.13
Rent regulation, in the form of rent control, was first
imposed in New York-and across the country-in 1943 as a part
of a federal wartime effort to reduce the city housing shortage,
which developed in the wake of World War II. 14 On March 1,
1950, rent regulation in New York moved from federal regulation
to state regulation with the enactment of the State Emergency
Housing Rent Control Law ("SEHRCL"). 15 Neither the federal
nor the state rent regulation scheme included a primary
residence requirement at this time. In 1969, rent stabilization
was instituted in New York City by the Rent Stabilization Law of
1969, and was later extended to other areas of the state in 1974
by the Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974.16 Again,
neither statute included a primary residence requirement.
11 The system of rent regulation encompasses both rent control and rent
stabilization. See 7 WARREN'S WEED NEW YORK REAL PROPERTY § 83.02 (Lorraine
Power Tharp et al. eds., 5th ed. 2009). The most significant difference between the
two systems is the level of rent increase that is permissible under each, with rent
stabilization allowing for a much greater increase. See id.
12 See id.
13 See id.
14 See Steven R. Weisman, Rent Control: Nobody May Ever Move Again, N.Y.
TIMES, May 30, 1971, at El.
15 See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 8581 (McKinney 1987). When the federal
government released control of rent-regulation systems to the states, it also allowed
states to eliminate the system entirely if the state could prove that the state was no
longer suffering a housing emergency. See Guy McPherson, Note, It's the End of the
World as We Know It (and I Feel Fine): Rent Regulation in New York City and the
Unanswered Questions of Market and Society, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1134-35
(2004). Most states opted to terminate the system and as of 1961, New York City was
the only municipality to maintain a rent control regime. See id. at 1135.
16 See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. 26, ch. 4, § 26-501 (West, Westlaw
through L. 2008, chs. 1-400 and Local Law 21 of 2008); see also N.Y. UNCONSOL.
LAWS § 8622 (McKinney 1974). Decision making authority for rent control had
previously been transferred from New York State to New York City, under the
administration of the local housing agency, with the passage of the Local Emergency
[Vol. 83:905
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The primary residence requirement first appeared in the
rent regulation framework in Chapter 373 of the Laws of New
York 1971.1' The Act amended the SEHRCL and the Local
Emergency Housing Rent Control Law ("LEHRCL") by allowing
for the removal of rent regulation protection from any housing
accommodation that was not the primary residence of the tenant
in possession-upon application by the landlord.1 8  In relevant
part, the Act stated that "housing accommodations which are not
occupied by the tenant in possession as his primary residence"
shall not be protected by rent regulation "whenever it is
established by any facts and circumstances which, in the
judgment of the commission, may have a bearing upon the
question of residence, that the tenant maintains his primary
residence at some place other than at such housing
accommodation."'9  This Act did not, however, give any
legislative definition to the phrase "primary residence."2 °
Since 1971, the primary residence requirement has remained
an essential element of rent regulation schemes in New York.
Accordingly, all four of the current statutes governing rent
regulation in New York contain provisions that permit the
removal of rent regulation protection from housing units not
occupied as a tenant's primary residence.2 Significantly, the
language of these statutes no longer explicitly references an
alternative primary residence like Chapter 373; rather, they now
read that rent regulation protection is exempted from dwelling
units "not occupied by the tenant ... as his or her primary
Housing Rent Control Law ("LEHRCL") and the subsequent enactment of the New
York City Rent and Rehabilitation Law in 1962. See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 8601-
17 (McKinney 1987); see also ADMIN. CODE tit. 26, ch. 3, §§ 26-401 to -415.
17 Ch. 373, § 1, 1971 N.Y. Laws 1164.
18 See id.
19 Id. (emphasis added).
20 The legislative memorandum on Chapter 373 did, however, provide some
examples that may constitute evidence relevant to the "question of residency." See
Memorandum of State Executive Department, reprinted in 1971 N.Y. Laws 2402
(McKinney); see also infra note 24 and accompanying text.
21 See ADMIN. CODE tit. 26, ch. 3, § 26-403 (city rent control); id. § 26-504(a) (city
rent stabilization); see also Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974, N.Y.
UNCONSOL. LAws § 8625 (McKinney 1974) (state rent stabilization); id. § 8582 (state
rent control). Additionally, courts often cite the primary residence requirement to
the Regulations of the State of New York instead of the statutes. See N.Y.C.R.R. tit.
9, ch. VIII, §§ 2524.4(c), 2520.11(k) (LEXIS through Aug. 2009).
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residence."22 The only other significant difference between the
primary residence requirement enacted in 1971 and the provision
as employed today is the transfer of authority to make a primary
residence determination from administrative agencies to the
courts.2 3 More importantly, what the current statutes do share
with their predecessor is the complete lack of a legislative
definition for the concept of "primary residence."
In light of the absence of a statutory definition, various
regulations have been enacted and amended to help clarify the
concept of "primary residence." Like the statutes, however, no
version of the primary residence regulations provide an explicit
definition of the term.24 Birthed unofficially in the legislative
memoranda in support of Chapter 373, the first legislative
attempt to give the term a more concrete meaning came in the
form of suggestions as to possible evidence that may be used to
make a primary residence determination. 5 Importantly, the
criteria suggested in this memorandum paralleled the language
and idea of the statutes, stating that the suggested evidence may
be used to determine that a tenant "maintains his primary
residence elsewhere" and by focusing exclusively on which
address a tenant listed on important documents.26 Accordingly, it
is clear that the legislature assumed the statutes would only
apply when a tenant possessed more than one residence.
The first official primary regulations promulgated by the
New York legislature shifted the focus of the analysis from a
comparison of addresses to a focus on a tenant's relationship to
New York itself. Section 54(e) of the former Rent Stabilization
Code and section 18 of the former Rent and Eviction Regulations,
the first codified regulations to assess primary residence claims,
provided a mandatory two-pronged test for making primary
22 ADMIN. CODE tit. 26, ch. 3, § 26-403; see id. § 26-504(a); N.Y. UNCONSOL.
LAWS §§ 8625, 8582. Unfortunately, legislative history is silent on the reason for this
change.
23 See Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1983, Ch. 403, § 55, 1983 N.Y. Laws
739-40 (McKinney).
24 See Batista, supra note 10, at 1 ("[Tlhe words 'primary residence' appear
frequently-but without any legislative definition-in the constellation of statutes
and regulations designed to implement the system of rent regulation.").
25 See Memorandum of State Executive Department, reprinted in 1971 N.Y.
Laws 2402 (McKinney).
26 See id. (emphasis added) (citing relevant evidence as "the address from which
the tenant votes, files his tax returns, etc.").
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residence determinations27 : (1) the tenant must have been
domiciled in New York City or, if not domiciled in the City, he or
she must have spent "an aggregate of more than 183 days in the
preceding calendar year at the apartment"; and (2) in either
situation, the tenant must have filed a New York City Resident
Income Tax Return at the subject residence-unless not
otherwise required for a reason set forth in the regulations.28
Compliance with or failure to meet both prongs resulted in a
conclusive primary residence determination.29
The primary residence regulations were adjusted for a
second time by the Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1983.
This Act effectively repealed the former code and regulations and
granted the courts much greater leniency, while simultaneously
offering less guidance, in making a primary residence
determination by eliminating the conclusive nature of the
previous guidelines." Instead, the post-Emergency Tenant
Protection Act regulations embodied in the current Code list four
non-exclusive and non-determinative factors for courts to
consider when making a primary residence determination:
(1) Specification by an occupant of an address other than such
housing accommodation as a place of residence on any tax
return, motor vehicle registration, driver's license or other
document filed with a public agency;
(2) Use by an occupant of an address other than such housing
accommodation as a voting address;
(3) Occupancy of the housing accommodation for an aggregate of
less that 183 days in the most recent calendar year...
(4) Subletting of the housing accommodation. 31
27 Menachem J. Kastner & Alan D. Zuckerbrod, Primary Residence Litigation-
Analysis of Emerging Case Law, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 25, 1987, at 1.
2 See Cent. Park W., Inc. v. Greenwald, 127 Misc. 2d 547, 548, 486 N.Y.S.2d
668, 670 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1985) (discussing section 18 of the former New
York City Rent and Eviction Regulations); Newport Apartments Co. v. Schechter,
124 Misc. 2d 760, 763-64, 477 N.Y.S.2d 576, 578-80 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1984) (discussing section 54(E) of the former Rent Stabilization Code).
29 See Kastner & Zuckerbrod, supra note 27, at 1.
20 See Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1983, Ch. 403, § 41(a), 1983 N.Y.
Laws 731 (McKinney) (leaving the court to determine what primary residence
means).
31 N.Y.C.R.R. tit. 9, ch. VII, § 220.3(j) (2009). This list is not exclusive and the
court may also consider evidence including utility usage, telephone records, and
testimonial evidence of usage of the subject apartment. See Cox v. J.D. Realty
Assocs., 217 A.D.2d 179, 184, 637, N.Y.S.2d 27, 30 (1st Dep't 1995).
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Although the new regulations were designed to give courts
greater flexibility, it is clear that they, like the original
guidelines, direct courts to focus mainly on the address utilized
by the tenant on certain documents, while inquiries into the
tenants' usage of the apartment are less persuasive.32
Ultimately, however, these regulations offer only suggestions
and, like the primary residence statutes, fail to provide courts
with a clear legislative standard for assessing primary residence
claims.
B. Preliminary Glance at the Legislative Purpose in Creating a
Primary Residence Requirement
The requirement that a housing unit must be used as a
tenant's primary residence to enjoy the protection of rent
regulation was added to the already existent rent regulation
system in 1971 by Chapter 373 .3 The bill was a part of Governor
Nelson Rockefeller's plan to reform the rent control system,
which was originally enacted to ameliorate the housing crisis of
the 1940s, but also had the unintended effect of creating new
avenues for abuse of New York's limited housing supply.3 4 In the
legislative memoranda concerning Chapter 373, the Legislature's
Statement in Support of the Bill explained:
At a time when the people of the State, particularly in the City
of New York, are confronted with a critical shortage of housing,
it is inequitable and anomalous that some persons receive the
economic benefits of retaining the rent-controlled status of their
housing accommodations although their primary residence is
elsewhere.
35
Clearly, the legislature created the primary residence
requirement to eliminate the opportunity for abuse of the rent
regulation system by targeting persons who were thwarting the
,2 See Claridge Gardens, Inc. v. Menotti, 160 A.D.2d. 544, 544, 554 N.Y.S.2d
193, 194 (1st Dep't 1990) (stating that failure to meet the 183-day usage factor is not
sufficient, by itself, to support a finding of non-primary residence); see also DANIEL
FINKELSTEIN & LUCAS A. FERRARA, NEW YORK PRACTICE SERIES - LANDLORD AND
TENANT PRACTICE IN NEW YORK § 15:476 (2008) (stating that inquiry for primary
residence determinations should focus on the address utilized on documentation,
while evidence concerning usage is merely permitted).
3 See Governor's Approval Memorandum, Bill Jacket, ch. 373, L. 1971.
34 See id.
3' Memorandum of State Executive Department, reprinted in 1971 N.Y. Laws
2402 (McKinney) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 83:905
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system's intended purpose-making affordable housing available
to the State's residents during a period of housing shortage-by
usurping affordable housing when they had no need for this
benefit because they could actually afford to concurrently
maintain two homes.
Additionally, the New York legislature exhibited a
protectionist purpose in trying to protect its own residents from
abuse, not only by persons with additional residences, but by
further narrowing the statutes' scope to persons primarily
domiciled outside of New York. 6 These tenants truly living in
other states, yet usurping New York's affordable housing, had no
true need for affordable housing as did true New Yorkers with
two residences. They, however, exacerbated this abuse of the
rent regulation system by taking advantage of a New York State
benefit without compensating the state in return by paying
resident income taxes or in the form of daily expenditures to local
businesses, which are customarily made when actually living in a
state.
The legislature both understood and made apparent that the
primary residence requirement was meant to be a tool of equity,
aimed at persons without a need for an affordable home in New
York when they were affluent enough to possess more than one
home, and specifically when their true residence was not in New
York. In his statement approving Chapter 373, Governor
Rockefeller echoed this two-fold aim of Chapter 373 by citing
persons with additional residences outside the city as those the
primary residence requirement should affect.17 Also discernable
in Rockefeller's statement is that the primary residence
requirement was enacted with an underlying tone of fairness and
the recognition that a tenant's attachment to a certain residence
should be influential in a primary residence analysis. This
36 See id. (stating that this requirement would increase the availability of
housing accommodations to "actual residents of the community who are in need of
apartments"). The legislature goes on to cite as an example of persons who maintain
their primary residence elsewhere as persons "who, rather than paying hotel
facilities when their presence is required in the community, find it less expensive to
retain year-round possession of rent controlled housing accommodations [in New
York] which they rarely occupy." See id.
" See Governor's Approval Memorandum, Bill Jacket, ch. 373, L. 1971 (defining
persons who do not use their homes as their primary residence as persons who use
their apartments for convenience, "staying in them occasionally when they come to
the City," or even use them for storage (emphasis added)).
2009]
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sentiment is manifest in the test Rockefeller proposed to make a
primary residence determination: decontrol after a finding that
the apartment is not the "real home" of the tenant.
While the overarching purpose in adding a primary
residence requirement to the existent rent regulation system was
to prevent abuse of the system by returning underutilized
residences to the market, the goal was not meant to be realized
with utter disregard of the intended scope. The requirement was
intended to further rent regulation's overall goal of decreasing
homelessness in New York. More importantly, to do so, the
legislature sought to target a specific group of persons, who
would not exacerbate the housing crisis by actually becoming
homeless when the primary residence laws were applied-
especially when those persons were domiciled outside of New
York. Accordingly, application of the requirement without
recognition of the limitations on its scope fails to realize the aims
of the primary residence legislation.
C. Judicial Interpretation of the Primary Residence
Requirement
Since neither the statutes nor the regulations delineate a
specific test to be used in making a primary residence
determination, the standard that has developed has come
entirely from case law. The primary residence standard emerged
first as a definition, then developed into a test to be used by
courts in assessing such claims. In Emay Properties Corp. v.
Norton,39 a case often denoted as the pioneering case in defining
the primary residence requirement, the Appellate Term First
Department stated, "[wie take primary residence to mean an
ongoing, substantial, physical nexus with the controlled premises
for actual living purposes-which can be demonstrated by
objective, empirical evidence."4" This definition began to expand
into a test for assessing primary residence claims in Sarraf v.
Szunics.41 The Sarraf court, echoing the language of Chapter
373, allocated the burden of proof to the landlord upon seeking
eviction on grounds of non-primary residence, stating that
-' See id.
39 136 Misc. 2d 127, 519 N.Y.S.2d 90 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1987).
40 Id. at 128-29, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
41 132 Misc. 2d 96, 503 N.Y.S.2d 513 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1986).
[Vol. 83:905
DEFINING PRIMARY RESIDENCE
initially "the burden is on the landlord to establish that the
tenant maintains a primary residence at some place other than
the subject premises."42
In reconciling these two statements without explicit
guidance from statutes or regulations, two possible tests for
determining primary residence have developed. In the first
instance ("the Initial Burden Test"), the Sarraf court's reference
to an alternative primary residence is taken as an independent
threshold determination.43 Initially, a landlord must prove that a
tenant possesses at least two residences. If two residences are
established, then to prove that the dwelling is not the tenant's
primary residence, the landlord must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the tenant does not have an
"ongoing, substantial, physical nexus" with the subject unit "for
actual living purposes."' If, however, the tenant has only one
residence, that apartment is the tenant's primary residence per
se, and the tenant in possession cannot be evicted on primary
residence grounds.4 "
In an alternative test ("the Pure Physical Nexus Test")-
used for the first and only time in TOA Construction-the Sarraf
court's statement is taken merely as an allocation of the burden
of proof to the landlord in a non-primary residence case. Thus,
the landlord must only prove that the tenant failed to maintain
"an ongoing, substantial, physical nexus with the controlled
premises for actual living purposes. " " In this test, it is not
necessary to establish that a tenant has an alternative primary
42 Id. at 99, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 515 (emphasis added).
4 See 12 WARREN'S WEED NEW YORK REAL PROPERTY § 129.121[1] (5th ed.
2009) (emphasis added) ("The Appellate Term, First Department summarized
primary residence to mean 'an ongoing, substantial physical nexus with the
controlled premises for actual living purposes which can be demonstrated by
objective empirical evidence.' The burden of proof remains on the landlord to
establish that one residence as opposed to another is the tenant's primary
residence.").
" TOA Constr. Co. v. Tsitsires, 54 A.D.3d 109, 113, 861 N.Y.S.2d 335, 338 (1st
Dep't 2008).
For example, in Sharp v. Melendez, 139 A.D.2d 262, 531 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1st
Dep't 1988), the court conclusively determined the tenant's residence was his
primary residence after finding that he possessed only one residence, without
further inquiring as to his "physical nexus" with the subject apartment. See id. at
264-66, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 556-57; see also discussion infra Part II.C.
4 TOA Constr., 54 A.D.3d 109, 113, 861 N.Y.S.2d 335, 338 (quoting Emay Props.
Corp. v. Norton, 136 Misc. 2d 127, 129, 519 N.Y.S.2d 90, 92 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st
Dep't 1987).
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residence; the only relevant issue is how the tenant uses the
housing unit in question.47 Therefore, if a tenant does not
possess an alternative residence, the only criterion of the
regulations that is applicable in making a primary residence
determination is whether the tenant has spent 183 days in the
subject apartment.
For nearly thirty years, since authority for primary residence
determinations was given to the courts, the Initial Burden Test
was used to analyze such claims.48 Though courts did not always
explicitly describe a distinctly separate burden of proving at least
two residences, nearly every primary residence case in New York
involved a tenant who undisputedly possessed a secondary
residence, which evidences the understanding that claims
lacking an allegation of a secondary residence would quickly be
dismissed. In the rare case that a non-primary residence claim
was brought against a tenant who possessed only one residence,
it is this assertion that is the subject of the litigation.
Accordingly, the inquiry has traditionally focused on whether the
landlord could prove that the tenant actually possessed an
additional housing unit that could be considered a secondary
47 Case law has recognized certain exceptions to the primary residence
requirement, where underutilization of an apartment will not result in the loss of
rent regulation protection. See TOA Constr. Co. v. Tsitsires, 9 Misc. 3d 469, 490-91,
798 N.Y.S.2d 674, 690-91 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 2005), rev'd per curiam, 14
Misc. 3d 65, 830 N.Y.S.2d 16 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 2006), rev'd, 54 A.D.3d 109,
861 N.Y.S.2d 335. The exceptions involve questions of tenant intent and
abandonment. This Note, however, focuses on whether proving an alternative
residence is a necessary element of the primary residence test and will not address
the closely related topic of exceptions.
48 See, e.g., Katz v. Gelman, 177 Misc. 2d 83, 84-85, 676 N.Y.S.2d 774, 775 (Sup.
Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1998) ("Since landlords did not meet their burden of proving
that tenant does not occupy the loft as his primary residence, or maintains a
primary residence at a place other than the subject premises the petition must be
dismissed." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); see also Four Winds Assocs. v.
Rachlin, 248 A.D.2d 352, 353, 669 N.Y.S.2d 650, 650 (2d Dep't 1998) ("The burden
was on the plaintiff landlord to establish by a fair preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant maintained her primary residence in a place other than the
subject premises."); Sarraf v. Szunics, 132 Misc. 2d 97, 99, 503 N.Y.S.2d 513, 515
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1986) ("Initially it should be observed that the burden is
on the landlord to establish that the tenant maintains a primary residence at some
place other than the subject premises."); Rocky 116 L.L.C. v. Weston, N.Y. L.J., July
3, 2002, at 22, col. 4 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County) ("In a non-primary residence
holdover it is the petitioner's burden of proof to show that respondent maintains his
or her primary residence at a location other than the subject premises.").
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residence because a failure to satisfy this burden ended the
primary-residence claim without further analysis of a "physical
nexus."
49
D. TOA Construction Co. v. Tsitsires
Recently, the First Department, in TOA Construction Co. v.
Tsitsires,5 0 arguably for the first time, employed the Pure
Physical Nexus Test and declared that "[t]he terms of the Rent
Stabilization Code do not require proof that the tenant
maintain[s] an alternative primary residence. 5 1  In this
landmark decision, tenant Michael Tsitsires lost possession of
the rent-controlled apartment he had owned for thirty-five years
in Manhattan, for failure to use the apartment as his primary
residence although it was undisputed that he owned no other
residence.
Both the relevant facts of the case and the manner in which
they were presented highlight the subjectivity and evidentiary
issues that arise when subjecting tenants to a primary residence
analysis when it is undisputed that they do not possess a
secondary housing accommodation. The court recognized that
Tsitsires suffered from mental illness, specifically including a
panic disorder, which caused him to spend much of his time away
from the apartment and away from other persons.52 When not
staying in the apartment, Tsitsires slept outside on city benches
or stoops within a twenty-block "safe area" surrounding the
apartment.5 3 Throughout the contested period, Tsitsires kept his
personal possessions at the subject premises, received mail there,
and allowed his girlfriend of thirty-five years to do the same.54
Evidence of the frequency of Tsitsires' actual presence in the
apartment was greatly contested and entirely circumstantial.
The court relied on the testimony of the building's former
building manager who testified as to his recognition of Tsitsires'
habits and his assessment of four months of video surveillance of
the building's entrance taken over a year after service of the
" See discussion infra Part I.C.50 54 A.D.3d 109, 861 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1st Dep't 2008).
51 Id. at 113, 861 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
12 Id. at 112-14, 861 N.Y.S.2d at 337-38.
5 Id. at 112, 861 N.Y.S.2d at 337.
See id.
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notice of termination.55 The landlord paid the building manager
$3,000 to install the surveillance system and to later review the
footage in preparation for the litigation. 6
Despite the court's recognition that the streets cannot
constitute a primary residence and, therefore, Tsitsiris did not
maintain a primary residence elsewhere, Tsitsires lost possession
of the apartment.5 The court justified its decision by asserting
that the question for the court was solely whether the tenant
maintained "an ongoing, substantial, physical nexus with the
controlled premises for living purposes," which Tsitsires had not
done because he merely used the apartment for "storage facility
and mail drop."58 Upon discussing the policy rationale behind its
decision, the court, somewhat disjointedly, asserted that a failure
to evict Tsitsires would severely warp the concept of regulation,
but then contradicted itself by stating that Tsitsires' eviction
would not serve rent regulation's goal of alleviating the public
need for affordable housing in New York. 9 Using the primary
residence requirement to evict a tenant from his only home and
essentially issuing a judicial decree of homelessness does not
further the goal of reducing the housing crises in New York.
Proponents of the Pure Physical Nexus Test argue that critics of
this decision are driven by emotion rather than an analysis of the
law; however, an understanding of the purpose and history of
primary residence law reveals that it is precisely the distortion of
the requirement's aims that drives the objections. °
" See id. at 119, 861 N.Y.S.2d at 342.
56 See id.
" See id. at 116, 861 N.Y.S.2d at 340 ("[We are not finding that the tenant's
primary residence is a park bench. I think we all agree that a person cannot
maintain a primary residence on a park bench." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
' Id. at 115-16, 861 N.Y.S.2d at 339-40.
'9 See id. at 115-17, 861 N.Y.S.2d at 340-41.
60 See Dov Treiman, Commentary, TOA Constr. Co. v. Tsitsires, 36 HOUSING CT.
REP. 749, 750 (2008) ("It appears clear that the majority's view in this case is based
on its perception of 'law' and the dissent's view is based on its perception of
'justice.' ").
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II. THE PURE PHYSICAL NEXUS TEST CANNOT BE RECONCILED
WITH THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTES, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, PUBLIC POLICY, OR PRIOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
This Part examines whether the Initial Burden Test or the
Pure Physical Nexus Test is the appropriate test for analyzing
primary residence claims using the traditional mores of statutory
interpretation. Part II.A. evaluates each test in light of the plain
and ordinary meaning of the phrase "primary residence" and
concludes that the customary usage of the term clearly connotes
a comparison of at least two residences; thus, any interpretation
of a primary residence test requires a threshold showing that the
tenant possesses more than one housing accommodation.
Assuming, arguendo, that the plain meaning rule is not
conclusive, Part II.B. evaluates each test against the legislative
history and purpose of the primary residence requirement and
against the public policy objectives underlying the statutes. Part
II.B. concludes that while the primary residence requirement
was enacted to make underutilized apartments available to New
York residents who were in need of affordable housing, the
legislature demonstrated an unmistakable intent to limit the
target of the statutes to tenants who maintain at least two
residences. Finally, Part II.C. demonstrates that until TOA
Construction, judicial interpretation and application of the
primary residence statutes had been consistent with the two-
residence limitation gleaned from the traditional canons of
statutory interpretation.
A. Plain Language of the Primary Residence Statute
"The starting point in every case involving construction of a
statute is the language itself."61 Under the plain meaning rule,
"'when the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the
courts-at least where the disposition required by the text is not
absurd-is to enforce it according to its terms.' "62 When a
statute's language is plain, courts must give the language its
ordinary and natural meaning.63  If a word is not explicitly
61 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975).
62 Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (quoting Hartford Underwriters
Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)).
63 See id.
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defined in a statute, a court typically looks to dictionaries to
ascertain the common meaning of that word. 6' Because the term
"primary residence" has not been statutorily defined, one must
consider the term's commonplace meaning, as this meaning is
most likely the meaning the legislature intended. If the ordinary
definition of the term clearly indicates that being "primary"
demands the existence of something else for comparison, it
follows that the primary residence statute demands that a tenant
possess at least two residences. Accordingly, to determine
whether the primary residence test requires a court to make a
threshold inquiry into whether a tenant possesses at least two
residences before applying the Purely Physical Nexus Test, our
analysis must begin with the plain and ordinary meaning of the
term "primary residence."65
The common understanding that something can only be
"primary" when assessed in relation to something else strongly
favors use of the Initial Burden Test to assess primary-residence
claims-which requires a comparative analysis-recognizing that
the legislative intent, pursuant to the plain meaning rule,
intended this interpretation when drafting the statute. The
dictionary defines the word "primary" as "first or highest in rank
or importance" or "first in order in any series [or] sequence."66
This definition clearly connotes a comparative aspect.
Accordingly, something can only be considered primary when it is
compared by its importance to some other thing. Inherent in this
definition is the notion that there must be, at the very least, two
things ("residences") to compare. Further buttressing the
common understanding of the comparative nature of the word
"primary," Black's Law Dictionary, while not offering a definition
for the word "primary," or "primary residence," lists nine other
I See 224 E. 18th St. Assocs. v. Sijacki, 138 Misc. 2d 494, 498, 524 N.Y.S.2d 964,
967 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1987), affd, 143 Misc. 2d 565, 546 N.Y.S.2d 981 (Sup.
Ct. App. T. 3d Dep't 1989); see also Coronet Props. Co. v. Brychova, 122 Misc. 2d 212,
213, 469 N.Y.S.2d 911, 912 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1983), aff'd, 126 Misc. 2d 946,
488 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1984).
65 See Sijacki, 138 Misc. 2d at 497-98, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 967 ("The legislature has
provided no guidance as to what constitutes a primary residence. That is, however, a
term in common use .... ").
I See id. at 498, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 967 (quoting THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1987)); see also Coronet Props., 122 Misc. 2d at
213, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 912 ("The ordinary meaning of the word 'primary' is 'first in
rank or importance; chief or principal.'") (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1800 (1981)).
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phrases where primary precedes the subsequent word, each of
which is defined in relation to at least one other type of the base
word.
The first step in statutory interpretation, giving words of a
statute their plain and ordinary meaning, strongly suggests that
in implementing a primary residence requirement, the
legislature promulgated a standard to differentiate between at
least two residences. To rebut this presumption, proponents of
the Pure Physical Nexus Test attempt to disregard the plain
meaning rule entirely, actually faulting application of the canon
as far too literal an approach for statutory interpretation in the
primary residence context.6" This approach directly contradicts
one of the most well-known and universally accepted norms of
statutory interpretation. In fact, plain statutory language is
considered so indicative of legislative intent that when language
has a common meaning, the plain meaning rule is typically
considered the first and last step in statutory interpretation.69 In
discerning the proper primary residence test, the plain meaning
rule clearly sides with proponents of the Initial Burden Test,
which recognizes and enforces the phrase' commonplace
meaning.
67 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1228-29 (8th ed. 2004). For example: "Primary
Authority" as compared to "Secondary Authority"; "Primary Boycott" as compared to
"Secondary Boycott"; "Primary Liability" as compared to "Secondary Liability"; and
"Primary Obligation" as compared to "Secondary Obligation." See id. at 143, 199,
933, 1105.
6' See Dov Treiman, supra note 60, at 750 ("But without getting hung up on a
close reading of the word 'primary' .... "). Equally dismissive, in TOA Construction,
rather than confront the dissent's plea to the plain meaning rule, the majority
skirted the issue by noting the dissent's claim then merely restating that a landlord
need not provide evidence of a secondary residence to satisfy his burden of proving
non-primary residency instead of justifying their departure. See TOA Constr. Co. v.
Tsitsires, 54 A.D.3d 109, 112-13, 861 N.Y.S.2d 335, 337-38 (1st Dep't 2008).
69 See 49 WB, L.L.C. v. Vill. of Haverstraw, 44 A.D.3d 226, 233, 839 N.Y.S.2d
127, 133 (2d Dep't 2007) ("[A court's] primary purpose in interpreting [a] statute is
to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature, and the best evidence of
that intent is the plain wording of the statute itself."); see also Estate of Cowart v.
Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992) ("In a statutory construction case, the
beginning point must be the language of the statute, and when [that] statute speaks
with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all but most
extraordinary circumstance, is finished.").
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B. Legislative History and Purpose in Creating a Primary
Residence Requirement
1. Target of the Statutes
Though the canons of statutory interpretation generally
demand that unambiguous statutory language eliminates the
need for any further inquiry into legislative intent, "where the
language of the statute does not make crystal clear its intended
scope," a court must "resort to the legislative history to determine
whether, in light of articulated purposes of the legislation,
Congress intended that the statute apply to the particular cases
in question." 0 Legislative history indicates that the purpose in
engraphing a primary resident requirement into New York's
already existent rent regulation scheme was to reduce the
system's susceptibility to abuse. The primary residence
requirement was added in 1971, as a part of a series of bills
designed to reform the rent regulation system to ensure that the
system was not being used to exacerbate the very housing
shortage it was created to ameliorate. 1 More importantly, the
legislative history demonstrates that although the overarching
policy goal in enacting Chapter 373 was to alleviate the housing
shortage in New York, the bill was not enacted blindly, but
rather it targeted a very specific type of tenant who possessed at
least two residences. Additionally, the primary residence
requirement was further aimed at persons with homes in New
York, yet primarily domiciled elsewhere. Conversely, New York
domiciliaries, with only one residence, have traditionally been
viewed as outside the scope of the statutes' application.72
From both the language used by the legislature in
promulgating Chapter 373 and the Legislature's Statement in
Support of the Bill, it is obvious that the intended targets of the
primary residence bill were persons without a need for affordable
housing, demonstrated by their possession of more than one
residence. Both Chapter 373 and the legislative memoranda on
70 Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 570 (1969); see also Ganley v.
Giuliani (In re Ganley), 171 Misc. 2d 654, 660, 655 N.Y.S.2d 264, 268 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1997) ("A statute that can be interpreted in different, but reasonable, ways is
sufficiently ambiguous to warrant a court to consider legislative history to determine
[a] statute's intended scope."), rev'd, 94 N.Y.2d 207, 723 N.E.2d 73, 701 N.Y.S.2d 324
(1999).
71 See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
72 See infra notes 79, 82-86 and accompanying text.
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Chapter 373 explicitly state that the bill would allow for the
removal of rent regulation protection from any housing unit upon
a finding that the tenant "maintains his primary residence at
some place other than at such housing accommodation.""3 The
original framing of the primary residence language with a clear
reference to an additional place of residence evidences an
absolute legislative mandate that a tenant subject to this new
requirement must have at least two residences.
Corroborating the explicit language of the bill, Governor
Rockefeller, the initial author of the primary residence
requirement, undoubtedly intended that a secondary residence
was a precondition to the loss of rent regulation protection. In
the Governor's Memoranda explaining the purpose of his
proposed bill to the legislature, the section explaining Chapter
373 was labeled "Rent decontrol, secondary residences." In
choosing to label the section discussing Chapter 373 "secondary
residences," rather than using the language of the statute-
"primary residence"-it is clear that the Governor intended that
all tenants subject to the primary residence requirement would
be able to fit squarely within this heading. Accordingly, tenants
without a secondary residence could not fit under this label and
were not meant to be included in the primary residence
requirement.
Additionally, the senate debate concerning the enactment of
Chapter 373 demonstrates that the Senate understood that the
bill was would apply exclusively to persons with more than one
residence. 5 In describing the purpose of the bill to the Senate,
Senator Barclay stated:
This is the primary residence bill. Throughout the years since
rent control has been in effect throughout the State there has
been a practice because economically it is a good deal at times,
to have a rent-controlled apartment and to keep that apartment
in New York State but than have a secondary apartment,
somewhere else or a house such as in Florida or other areas and
73 Ch. 373, § 1, 1971 N.Y. Laws 1164 (emphasis added); see also Memorandum of
State Executive Department, reprinted in 1971 N.Y. Laws 2402 (McKinney). The
legislative statement summarizing the bill differs slightly from the actual language
of Chapter 373, explaining that decontrol would occur upon a finding "that the
tenant maintains his primary residence elsewhere." Memorandum of State Executive
Department, reprinted in 1971 N.Y. Laws 2402 (emphasis added).
" Governor's Memoranda, reprinted in 1971 N.Y. ST. LEGIS. ANN. 313.
75 See Senate Debate on Chapter 373, Bill Jacket, ch. 373, L. 1971, at 4710-16.
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since we do have such a tight housing market, it only seems
right that those who are in rent-controlled apartments have a
primary residence there and what the bill does is it allows the
landlord to [bring a suit on grounds of nonprimary residence] in
the event of this situation .... 76
Moreover, after explaining the bill as targeting persons with
multiple residences, the rest of the debate centered only on
whether it was proper to fault persons for having two residences.
This further strengthens the notion that the understanding and
intention of the legislature was that the bill was designed to
affect persons with at least two residences.7 In relevant part:
Senator Zaretzki:... A person has a right to have two
residences or more. Why should he not be permitted to do so?
Senator Barclay: In my opinion, the person with two
residences should pay his fair economic rent and not be
subsidized by the rest of the tenants. If he can afford two
residences, it appears to me that he should pay his fair share.
Senator Zaretzki: ... I really have trouble with this
bill.... They have a right to two residences....
Senator Ferraro:... If they can afford the luxury of traveling
around the world and traveling to other states of this nation, let
them have a decontrolled apartment and not buy up a controlled
apartment.78
The Senate debate demonstrates that the legislature perceived
an implicit fairness aspect inherent in the primary residence
requirement. The rent regulation system was designed to make
housing available to persons who previously could not afford any
housing at all, so prohibiting persons capable of affording more
than one residence from enjoying this privilege is easily justified.
The bill was promulgated with the understanding that it was
inequitable for persons who could afford to own two homes
simultaneously to usurp the limited supply of affordable housing
and the Senate's only issue of contention was whether it was
appropriate to target this affluent tenant. The possibility that a
tenant with only one residence would be subject to this
requirement was never even contemplated. Logically, it is
obvious that if the legislature raised issue with the
appropriateness of subjecting tenants with two residences to the
76 Id. at 4712 (statement of Senator Barclay) (emphasis added).
77 See id. at 4712-16.
71 Id. at 4713-14 (statements of Senators Zaretzki, Barclay, and Ferraro).
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loss of one of those residences, its members certainly would have
discussed the appropriateness of evicting persons from their only
residence if they intended that the statutes would be used
against this type of tenant.
Additionally, the intended target of the new primary
residence requirement was not only the affluent tenant who
could afford multiple residences, but specifically the out-of-stater
who was taking advantage of New York's rent regulation system
at the expense of the state's actual residents. In Governor
Rockefeller's Memoranda to the Legislature, he explains that the
primary residence requirement would "open up many of these
apartments to occupancy of actual residents of the community."7
Upon signing Chapter 373 into law, the Governor wrote:
"Thousands of controlled apartments in New York City and
elsewhere are rented by people who do not live in them. They
use the apartments as a convenience, staying in them
occasionally when they come to the City. Some [of these people]
even use them for storage." ° Once again, demonstrating its
understanding of the statute's specific target, the legislature-
Senator Ferraro specifically-upon debating the enactment of
Chapter 373 stated, "And if they cannot live in our City for at
least six months, I think they should pay the higher rent."8 '
71 Memorandum of State Executive Department, reprinted in 1971 N.Y. Laws
2402 (McKinney) (emphasis added).
80 Governor's Approval Memorandum, Bill Jacket, ch. 373, L. 1971 (emphasis
added).
81 Senate Debate on Chapter 373, Bill Jacket, ch. 373, L. 1971, at 4713-14
(statement of Senator Ferraro). The legislature was not alone in recognizing that the
primary residence requirement was designed to subject persons with two residences,
especially persons with secondary residences outside of New York, to the loss of rent
regulation protection. See Report of Rent Control Subcommittee, dated May 25,
1971, Bill Jacket, ch. 373, L. 1971, at 12 ("No benefit affecting... New York City
tenants appears to be provided by continued control of housing occupied by those
having a 'primary residence' outside the City or State." (emphasis added)); Letter of
the New York City Council Against Poverty, dated May 18, 1971, Bill Jacket, L.
1971, ch. 373, at 5 ("The idea of not permitting persons who maintain a secondary
residence in the City to benefit from Rent Control is good...." (emphasis added));
Batista, supra note 10 ("The concepts of residence and primary obviously raise a
series of potentially complex factual questions: ... [Wihich residence is primary,
[and] which [residence] is secondary?" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hole in
the Roof over Rents, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1971, at 40 ("[Chapter 373] calls for
decontrolling apartments held by tenant who have in fact moved to Florida or other
places but hang on to their low-rent apartments for occasional use."); Kastner &
Zuckerbrod, supra note 27 ("A continuing issue before courts in New York is the
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The focus on out-of-staters demonstrates that the original
primary residence statute had a protectionist purpose in
protecting genuine New York residents from persons domiciled
elsewhere, yet exploiting New York's rent regulation without
compensating the state in the form of taxes and daily living
expenses.82 This original focus on domicile created a legislative
and judicial expectation of leniency when a tenant was domiciled
in New York and undisputedly possessed only one residence,
even if it was rarely used-a leniency echoed in the regulations
promulgated to assess primary residence claims and case
precedent.
2. The Regulations Promulgated Corroborate the Legislative
Intent in Limiting Application of the Statutes to a Specific
Type of Tenant
Though they do not establish a mandatory primary residence
test, the New York legislature has passed regulations to guide
courts in application of the requirement, which also highlight
and corroborate the scope and policy aims gleaned from analysis
of the primary residence statutes. The administrative
interpretation given to a statute by an agency charged with its
enforcement is given "great weight and judicial deference," so
long as that interpretation is neither absurd, nor unreasonable. 83
Accordingly, the legislature's intent to limit the scope of the
primary residence statute by narrowing the scope of the
requirement to include only a specific type of tenant is both
apparent and persuasive in the regulations promulgated to
assess whether a certain residence would be considered a
primary residence. Like the statutes, the regulations target
matter of the housing rights of tenants with two homes, one of which is a primary
residence." (emphasis added)).
82 This Note argues that the original primary residence regulations, which
demanded a conclusive determination of primary residence if a tenant was domiciled
in New York City and filed resident income taxes from the subject residence,
demonstrates that the legislature was willing to allow actual New Yorkers
insulation from the statute because they would compensate the state in alternative
ways. Under the original regulations, a person domiciled in New York City could
possess two residences in New York, or could possess one residence, which they
never used and still enjoy rent regulation protection, presumably because the
legislature believed it was not improper for these tenants to enjoy affordable housing
when they contributed to the overall wealth of the state.
I See Trump-Equitable Fifth Ave. Co. v. Gliedman (In re Trump-Equitable Fifth
Ave. Co.), 62 N.Y.2d 539, 545, 467 N.E.2d 510, 513, 478 N.Y.S.2d 846, 849 (1984).
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tenants who are affluent enough to afford multiple residences,
especially those truly residing outside New York. The first
suggestions offered by the legislature came in the form of the
legislature's summary of Chapter 373.84 Though not officially
mandated, the legislature suggested that "the address from
which the tenant votes, files his tax returns, etc., would be
relevant" to determine that the tenant "maintains his primary
residence elsewhere."8 ' These suggestions demonstrate that the
legislature was concerned with usage of the apartment in
question, but that the inquiry into usage was exclusively
comparative in nature. In asking which of at least two addresses
a tenant specified as his true address on certain documents, the
legislature evidenced that it did not fathom that a tenant being
subjected to this assessment would possess only one residence.
Rather, the assumption was that every tenant facing a non-
primary residence claim would possess more than one residence.
The first official regulations promulgated to assess primary
residence claims exhibit the legislature's intent to further reduce
the scope of the primary residence requirement by insulating
tenants genuinely domiciled in New York City from facing the
loss of rent regulation protection despite even a complete lack of
use of their apartments. The first guidelines established a two-
pronged test: If a tenant was found to either be domiciled in New
York City or had spent a total of 183 days in the apartment, and
had filed a New York City Resident Income Tax Return from that
residence, it was conclusively determined that the residence in
question was the tenant's primary residence. 6 Theoretically,
under this version of the regulations, a tenant such as Michael
Tsitsires whose domicile undisputedly remained New York-
regardless of any contentions as to his residence-would have
undoubtedly defeated the landlord's non-primary residence claim
even if he had not spent a single day actually in the subject
apartment during the contested year. Being domiciled in New
York, such a tenant could defeat a primary residence claim
merely by filing the requisite tax form.
84 Memorandum of State Executive Department, reprinted in 1971 N.Y. Laws
2402 (McKinney).
8 Id. (emphasis added).
'6 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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In promulgating disjunctive regulations mandating either
domicile or usage, the legislature, though attempting to reduce
the housing shortage in New York, objectively manifested intent
to aim the primary residence requirement at a specific type of
tenant, while simultaneously insulating actual New Yorkers
from its scope. Because the primary residence requirement was
enacted to ensure that persons benefiting from New York's
affordable housing were "actual residents of the community,""7
the legislature was not concerned with actual usage of the
apartment upon a showing that a tenant receiving rent
regulation protection was genuinely domiciled in the city.
The first official primary residence regulations were replaced
with the Rent Stabilization Code's current list of four non-
exclusive and non-determinative factors, which neither highlight
the importance of domicile nor establish any mandatory
elements. Rather, the current code suggests four criteria, which
are relevant to the assessment of whether a certain residence is a
tenant's primary residence. 8  The Code does, however,
emphasize the need to establish more than one residence by
returning to the comparative analysis intended by the legislature
and manifested in the first unofficial suggestions offered to make
primary residence determinations. 89  The first two factors
unambiguously direct the courts to compare the relative
importance of two residences by assessing whether the tenant
votes from or lists "an address other than such housing
accommodation" on certain documents.90  The third factor-
whether the tenant has spent less than 183 days in the subject
apartment in the most recent year that they do not sublet-has
traditionally been used in a comparative fashion to determine
which of two residences was used more often, rather than as a
black letter minimum requirement. 91
Moreover, when a tenant in a non-primary residence claim
has only one residence, courts-prior to TOA Construction-have
consistently disregarded the 183-day requirement; instead,
courts continued to focus on the domicile of the tenant despite
87 Memorandum of State Executive Department, reprinted in 1971 N.Y. Laws
2402 (McKinney).
8' See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
'9 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
90 N.Y.C.R.R. tit. 9, ch. VII, § 2200.3(j)(1) (2000).
9 See, e.g., Sarrafv. Szunics, 132 Misc. 2d 97, 100-01, 503 N.Y.S.2d 513, 515-16
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1986).
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the elimination of an explicit domicile exception in the
regulations.92 This leniency demonstrates a parallel legislative
propensity towards comparison in the sense of balancing
intended policy aims. When the tenant is an actual resident of
the community who would face homelessness because the subject
unit is their only dwelling, the interest in protecting actual
residents of the community from of underutilization of rent-
controlled housing units is far lessened.
Lastly, it is commonsensical to infer that the fourth criterion,
which focuses on whether a tenant has sublet the subject
residence, was promulgated by the legislature upon the
underlying assumption that the tenant would not be rendering
himself homeless by subletting his only residence. The
subletting of the residence would provide objective evidence that
the tenant maintained at least two residences, and that the
possession of the residence in question was not used primarily for
living purposes, but rather for profiteering motives.
3. Public Policy Implications
The public policy objectives of the primary residence
requirement must be framed in a manner consistent with the
explicit language and legislative history of the primary residence
statutes and regulations, which clearly demonstrate that the
requirement was created with both a specific purpose and a
specific target. Proponents of the Pure Physical Nexus Test base
their strongest argument for denying the necessity to prove at
least two residences before applying the "substantial, physical
nexus" analysis on the public policy that the goal of rent
regulation is "to alleviate the shortage of housing in New York
City by returning underutilized apartments to the market."93
This approach distorts the intended goal of the legislature in
enacting the primary residence requirement by selectively
focusing on the aim of the legislation and disregarding the
intended target. Rather than directing the effort to reduce the
92 See id.; see also infra Part II.C. The pre-Omnibus regulations established a
"domicile exception" in the sense that upon a showing of New York City domicile and
a filing of a Resident Income Tax Return from the subject residence, a claim of non-
primary residence was defeated without any inquiry into usage. See supra note 28
and accompanying text.
93 TOA Constr. Co. v. Tsitsires, 54 A.D.3d 109, 117, 861 N.Y.S.2d 335, 341 (1st
Dep't 2008) (quoting Herzog v. Joy (In re Herzog), 74 A.D.2d 372, 374, 428 N.Y.S.2d
1 (1st Dep't 1980)), affd, 53 N.Y.2d 821, 422 N.E.2d 582, 439 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1981)).
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need for housing to any specific portion of the rent-regulated
population, proponents of the Pure Physical Nexus Test demand
a blanket decontrol of all apartments, which are perceived to be
underutilized. For example, in TOA Construction, the court
proclaimed, "[h]owever sympathetic respondent's plight, the
concept of rent-stabilized tenancy is warped beyond recognition"
by a tenant who uses the apartment solely for convenience and
storage.94
While advocates of the Pure Physical Nexus Test are correct
in stating that the goal of the primary residence requirement is
to alleviate the need for affordable housing in New York, they fail
to recognize that the legislature imbued an implicit fairness
element into the primary residence requirement; one that is
objectively manifested in the language and history of the statutes
and regulation that were designed to ensure that persons who
would face the loss of one residence were those that had another
residence elsewhere.95  In fact, the assertion often used by
proponents of the Pure Physical Nexus Test to justify the blanket
underutilization theory, that the use of a residence for purposes
of convenience and storage is improper, is significantly distorted.
The reference to convenience and storage originated from an
example in Governor Rockefeller's statement upon signing
Chapter 373, which noted that this type of usage was improper,
but further specified that the behavior was improper when done
by a specific type of tenant who possessed more than one
residence, one of which was located outside of New York, where
they were truly living.96  The statement was not intended to
allow arbitrary judicial determinations of adequate usage, which
would result in eviction from a tenant's only home, but instead
presupposed that eviction based on determinations of this nature
could only be justified when a tenant has some other residence to
live in, a showing that would be objectively demonstrated by
documentary evidence.
Allowing the eviction of tenants domiciled in New York who
have only one residence on grounds of non-primary residency
would actually exacerbate the need for affordable housing in the
state. Failing to demand that a landlord must establish that a
tenant maintains at least two residences would allow the
' See id. at 115, 861 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
95 See infra Part II.B. 1.
' See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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primary residence requirement to become a tool used by
landlords to threaten a much broader class of rent-regulated
tenants with eviction than those that could be affected when a
court employs the Initial Burden Test. Paradoxically, this new
type of tenant is a tenant who will face homelessness upon
eviction from his sole residence, by a legislative tool designed to
reduce this very problem.97
While the legislature has the authority to choose the scope of
its legislative aims, it is clear from the language, history, and
policy aims of the primary residence requirement that the
legislature did not intend to affect persons with one residence
who choose to live an atypical lifestyle for reasons unrelated to
the abuse of the rent regulation system. It is proper for the
legislature to broaden the scope of the primary residence
requirement to reach this type of tenant if it believes such an
expansion is necessary; however, judicially broadening this scope
in contradiction to objective legislative limitations is an improper
usurpation of the legislative function. Until and unless the
legislature takes this action, courts should employ the Initial
Burden Test to implement the legislature's intent concerning
primary residence regulation.
C. Judicial Recognition of the Limited Scope of the Primary
Residence Requirement
As previously noted, non-primary residence suits have rarely
been brought against tenants with only one residence, but when
these suits have been brought, courts, in accordance with the
intended legislative scope of the requirement, have never-prior
to TOA Construction-found a tenant's only residence not to be
their primary residence. Most courts, even after the specific
reference to a "secondary residence" disappeared from the
language of the primary residence statute, have continued to
echo the original language of Chapter 373, explicitly stating that
97 Like Tsitsires, tenants who do not fall into the traditional categories of
exemption from primary residence regulation, yet possess only one housing
accommodation, will face eviction from their only place of residence or face the
burden of defending themselves from such a claim. For example, a tenant who works
excessive hours, often spending the night at the office, or a tenant who spends a
significant time at a mate's residence, and who has no intention to end this conduct,
may face eviction from their only housing accommodation.
2009]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
in a non-primary residence case, a landlord must demonstrate
that the tenant maintains their primary residence somewhere
other than the subject residence.98
Moreover, courts have not interpreted the language
demanding evidence of an alternative primary residence merely
as an allocation of the burden of proof as proponents of the Pure
Physical Nexus Test argue, but rather, in line with proponents of
the Initial Burden Test, most courts have applied a two-pronged
test in deciding primary residence cases, where the existence of
an alternative residence is a separate showing that must be
made.99 When a landlord has not been able to make a threshold
showing of at least one other residence, no court-prior to TOA
Construction-has ever continued the primary residence analysis
by applying the "substantial, physical nexus" test to asses the
tenant's relationship with their only residence.
For example, in Sharp v. Melendez,'00 a landlord brought a
suit on non-primary residence grounds against a tenant who was
leasing two apartments on different floors of the same building.
101
There, the landlord claimed that the tenant was not using one of
the two apartments as his primary residence and sought
possession of that apartment pursuant to the primary residence
statutes.102  The tenant, however, claimed that the two
apartments should in fact be considered one apartment, and
accordingly, because he legally possessed only one apartment,
that apartment was per se his primary residence. 10 3 The court
agreed and found that the two apartments were, in fact, only one
residence and, therefore, the landlord failed to meet his burden of
proving non-primary residence.10 4
98 See supra text accompanying note 49.
See Katz v. Gelman, 177 Misc. 2d 83, 84, 676 N.Y.S.2d 774, 775 (1st Dep't
1998) (finding that the "landlords did not meet their burden of proving that tenant
does not occupy the loft as his primary residence, or maintains a primary residence
at a place other than the subject residence") (emphasis added).
100 139 A,D.2d 262, 531 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1st Dep't 1988).
'' See id. at 263-64, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 555-56.
102 See id. at 264, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
1'3 See id. at 263, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 555. It is well recognized that in certain
situations, two non-contiguous apartments may legally be considered a single
residential unit for purposes of primary residence determinations. See id. at 265, 531
N.Y.S.2d at 557. It seems likely that this principle was developed upon the
underlying assumption that if a tenant could prove that he only owned one
residence, then that residence would constitute his primary residence without any
further inquiry into usage.
'04 See id, at 266, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 557.
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The Sharp court held in no uncertain terms that "[i]n a
nonprimary residence case, the burden is on the landlord to
establish that the tenant maintains a primary residence in a
place other than the subject premises."105 After finding that the
two apartments were legally only one residence, the court ended
its inquiry without assessing the tenant's "substantial, physical
nexus" with the residence because the landlord could not prove
that the tenant possessed a secondary residence.
The Sharp court's explicit language and its application of the
primary residence test clearly demonstrates that a landlord must
make a threshold showing that a tenant maintains at least two
residences before proceeding to an assessment of "physical
nexus," yet the court in TOA Construction egregiously
misconstrues this clear mandate in an attempt to justify its
misdirected use of the Pure Physical Nexus Test. The TOA
Construction court, attempting to validate its use of the Pure
Physical Nexus Test, distinguished the holding in Sharp by
suggesting that there is a different primary residence test in
cases involving two noncontiguous apartments that is
inapplicable to traditional non-primary residence cases. 106 The
court claimed that Sharp and cases like it are different because
the landlord typically frames his claim by stating that the tenant
resides in an alternative residence rather than directly alleging
that the tenant does not primarily reside in the subject
apartment. 10 7 Therefore, the court correctly demanded that the
landlord demonstrate proof that the tenant did in fact possess an
alternative residence, but that this was a burden placed upon
himself, not the court, by the nature of his claim. l08
Alternatively, the TOA Construction court claimed that the
Sharp court, despite its statement regarding an alternative
residence, ruled against the landlord not because he failed to
demonstrate an alternative residence, but because he failed to
1O5 See id. at 264, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
106 See TOA Constr. Co. v. Tsitsires, 54 A.D.3d 109, 113, 861 N.Y.S.2d 335, 338
(1st Dep't 2008).
107 See id. at 113, 861 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
10' See id.
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demonstrate that the tenant did not have a "substantial physical
nexus" with the apartment in question because the two
apartments were actually a single residence.'0 9
There is simply no support in the primary residence statutes
and regulations, legislative history, or even in Sharp itself to
support the notion that a different primary residence test should
be applied to cases involving noncontiguous apartments. First,
there is no judicial precedent-in any area of law-that supports
the assertion that a claimant can be subjected to the burden of
proof that he himself creates instead of the test governed by the
law in that area. In stating that a landlord has the burden of
proving that the tenant resides in some place other than the
residence in question, the Sharp court did not employ any
qualifying language to limit this rule to specific types of primary
residence claims." °  Rather, the statement was made as a
conclusion of law, in the typical fashion of a court explaining the
body of law in a certain area before applying those rules to the
facts of the case.
Secondly, the Sharp court's ruling that the landlord failed to
meet his burden did not rest on the failure of the landlord to
meet the "substantial physical nexus test," but rather it was
decided on the underlying assumption that a tenant's only home,
when domiciled in New York, is per se his or her primary
residence. The decision centered on whether or not the two
apartments could be considered a single residence, because if
either one was the tenant's only residence, the court recognized
that it must conclusively determine it was the tenant's primary
residence."' The Sharp court explained: "The issue before us is
whether two noncontiguous apartments leased by defendant
tenant comprise a single residential unit and, as such, constitute
a primary residence subject to the protection of the rent
regulatory statutes.""' 2 Likewise, the court's holding focused not
on usage of the two apartments to determine which apartment
was primary, but rather the focus on usage of the apartments
was limited to the question of whether the two could be
109 TOA Constr. Co. v. Tsitsires, 9 Misc. 3d 469, 488, 798 N.Y.S.2d 674, 688-89
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 2005), reu'd, 14 Misc. 3d 65, 830 N.Y.S.2d 16 (Sup. Ct.
App. T. 1st Dep't 2006), rev'd, 54 A.D.3d 109, 861 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1st Dep't 2008).
110 See Sharp, 139 A.D.2d at 263, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
"I See id. at 263, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
112 Id. (emphasis added).
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considered a single residence." 3 In analyzing the landlord's non-
primary residence claim, the Sharp court undoubtedly employed
the Initial Burden Test in initially assessing whether the
landlord had established the existence of a secondary residence.
When the landlord failed to meet this burden, the court ended its
analysis, determining that the tenant's only residence was per se
his primary residence.
Additionally, case precedent demonstrates that courts have
continuously refused to permit a finding of non-primary
residence when a tenant maintains only one residence, by
continuing to focus on domicile rather than usage, as the
legislature initially mandated in the first official primary
residence guidelines." 4 As previously discussed, the disjunctive
usage or domicile test of the original guidelines demanded that a
tenant domiciled in New York City conclusively defeated a non-
primary residence claim even if that tenant did not spend a
single day in the subject apartment-provided they filed
Resident Income Tax Returns from the apartment." 5
Accordingly, a tenant domiciled in New York, but clearly
underutilizing the apartment, was not considered to be
undermining the purpose of rent regulation.
Despite the removal of any specific reference to domicile in
the current primary residence regulations, courts have continued
to hold that in instances where a tenant undisputedly possesses
only one residence, the tenant's domicile is given nearly
determinative weight in deciding primary residence. 116  For
113 See id. at 264-65, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 556. The court held that "[tihis burden was
not met here, where tenant and his parents ... gave extensive and persuasive
testimony establishing that tenant in fact maintains apartments 2-H and 9-U as a
single residential unit." Id. at 265, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 556. The court supported this
decision by describing how the tenant used each apartment. See id. at 265, 531
N.Y.S.2d at 556-57. The court did not, however, employ the language "substantial
physical nexus" or employ any of the four criteria listed in the regulations. Rather,
the analysis was consistent with the intent-based approach used to determine
whether two non-contiguous apartments can be considered a single apartment, and
completely inconsistent with traditional primary residence analysis.
114 See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
115 See id.
116 See Coronet Props. Co. v. Brychova, 122 Misc. 2d 212, 213, 469 N.Y.S.2d 911,
912 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1983), affd, 126 Misc. 2d 946, 488 N.Y.S.2d 1020
(Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1984); see also Sommer v. Ann Turkel, Inc., 137 Misc. 2d
7, 10, 522 N.Y.S.2d 765, 767 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1987) ("A tenant's domicile
may be a factor to consider, particularly in the situation where a tenant spends little
time in New York but is not shown to have any other primary or permanent
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example, in Coronet Properties Co. v. Byrchova, the court, upon
holding that an apartment-located in Manhattan-used on
average only a "handful of days every year" by a tenant who had
no other residence, was her primary residence, stated:
While there may be instances when a legal domicile is not a
tenant's primary residence within the meaning of the Rent
Stabilization Law, the two concepts are not unrelated; legal
domicile ordinarily will be sufficient to prove primary residence
unless there are unusual circumstances demonstrating that the
legal domicile is being maintained for reasons unrelated to
housing accommodations. 117
There, the tenant was a professional singer and music teacher
who traveled extensively throughout the United States and
Canada."' While on tour, the tenant stayed in private homes
provided to her by certain sponsors and stayed in her residence
in New York for about three days out of every month." 9 Despite
her "itinerant" lifestyle, the court found that subjecting her to the
loss of rent regulation would be counterproductive to the goals of
the legislature in enacting the primary residence requirement
because, although she barely spent any time in the apartment,
that apartment was still her home; a home she needed for actual
living purposes. 2 °
In Sarraf v. Szunics,12 1 the court, in determining a non-
primary residence claim, incorporated the notions that: (1) the
primary residence requirement was not meant to affect persons
with only one residence; (2) the public policy behind the
requirement cannot be selectively interpreted; and (3) domicile
continues to be a nearly conclusive factor when a tenant does not
possess at least two residences.122 In Sarraf, the tenant facing
residence."). Moreover, removal of the domicile exception was most likely meant to
extend the target of the primary residence statutes to curb abuse by persons with
more than one residence in the state who were previously immune from the statutes
upon a showing of New York City domicile and not meant to allow the eviction of
tenants with only one residence. Given the legislature's concern in the
appropriateness of evicting persons with two residences from only one residence
pursuant to the statute, the lack of any legislative debate on the equity of evicting
tenants from their only residence implies that the elimination of domicile was not
intended to lead to this result.
117 Coronet Props., 122 Misc. 2d at 214, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
118 See id. at 212, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 911-12.
119 See id. at 212, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
120 See id. at 214, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 912-13.
121 132 Misc. 2d 97, 503 N.Y.S.2d 513 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1986).
122 See id. at 98-101, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 515-16.
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eviction on non-primary residence grounds spent only two to
three hours, two times a week, in the subject apartment, while
spending all other time at her business-which was actually her
sister's apartment. 123 The court first employed the Initial Burden
Test, finding that to prevail the landlord must "establish that the
tenant maintains a primary residence at some place other than
the subject premises."124 The court further explained, "[t]hus, to
prevail petitioner must establish that the.. . business apartment
is her primary residence." 25 Accordingly, the landlord could only
meet his burden of proof if he could show that the business
residence constituted a secondary residence, or else the tenant's
only residence would constitute her primary residence per se.
Ultimately, the court found that although the tenant lives a
"bizarre existence" and that the apartment was clearly
underutilized, the tenant did not possess a secondary residence
and thus was not the type of tenant that was meant to be
targeted by the primary residence statute; therefore, she could
not be evicted on non-primary residence grounds. 126 The court
explained that "[a]lthough the goal of the primary residence law
was to remove 'the benefits of rent control with respect
to... underutilized housing accommodations,' such result only
occurs if the tenant does maintain a primary residence
elsewhere."27
To further support the outcome, the court noted that
domicile continues to be an incredibly influential factor in
deciding primary residence claims when a tenant has only one
residence, even after the specific domicile requirement
disappeared from the official regulations. 28 The court explained,
" 'where a statute prescribes 'residence' as a qualification for a
privilege or the enjoyment of a benefit, the word is equivalent to
'domicile.' ",129 Finally, the court noted that the tenant's domicile
continued to remain the subject apartment, despite the fact that
she rarely spent any time there because she kept most of her
123 See id. at 98, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
124 Id. at 99, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
125 Id.
126 See id. at 98-99, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 514-15.
127 Id. at 99, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 515 (citation omitted).
128 See id. ("On analysis, primary residence is closely related to the concept of
domicile.").
12 Id. at 100, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 515 (quoting State v. Collins, 78 A.D.2d 295, 297,
435 N.Y.S.2d 161, 163 (3d Dep't 1981)).
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possessions in the apartment. 130  Ultimately the court,
incorporating the inherent fairness element intended by the
legislature, determined that the tenants only residence was her
primary residence because "there is no proof that retention of
this apartment.., is a fiction or device employed to enable her to
retain the benefits of rent regulation."131
Although the case law concerning primary residence claims
involving tenants who possess only one residence is slight, the
precedent that does exist-prior to TOA Construction-uniformly
recognizes that a tenant domiciled in New York who does not
possess a secondary residence is not the intended target of the
primary residence requirement. In recognizing this notion, the
courts addressing the issue have both impliedly and explicitly
found that the Initial Burden Test is the proper test to employ
when assessing primary residence claims against tenants who
undisguisedly possess only one residence.
D. Additional Considerations
The implications of allowing judicial application of a primary
residence test which does not demand that a landlord make an
initial showing that a tenant maintains at least two residences is
not only inconsistent with the traditional means of statutory
interpretation, but it also fosters constitutional infringement of
privacy rights, raises due process concerns, and is inconsistent
with the legislative demand for objectivity in making these
determinations. 112 When a tenant undisputedly possesses only
one residence, which he has not sublet, the only criteria left to
assess a primary residence claim concerns how much time that
tenant has spent in the residence.133  Ultimately, in this
situation, the primary residence test becomes a test to determine
whether a rent-paying tenant has spent a sufficient amount of
time in his own residence to avoid eviction from his or her only
home.
130 See id. at 100-01, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 515-16.
131 Id. at 101, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
132 See Emay Props. Co. v. Norton, 136 Misc. 2d 127, 128-29, 519 N.Y.S.2d 90,
92 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1987) (stating that evidence of primary residence must
be objective and empirical).
13 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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Basing the entirety of the primary residence determination
on the amount of time spent in the subject apartment both
contradicts the legislative demand for objectivity and also clashes
with numerous court decisions stating that the amount of time
spent in the apartment "is not a sufficient basis for a finding of
non-primary residence."134 More importantly, because courts
have been unwilling to see the 183-day requirement as a strict
requirement, 135 similar fact patterns will result in vastly different
outcomes. The possibility of subjecting persons to eviction, a
severe civil penalty, without sufficiently clear standards to
provide adequate notice raises due process concerns and leaves
the 1.4 million rent-regulated tenants in New York 136 with few
guidelines to structure their behavior to avoid eviction from their
only homes. 137
Furthermore, privacy concerns are implicated when a court,
basing its determination entirely on usage of the apartment, will
surely be forced to rely on hidden surveillance and other
intrusive methods of tenant monitoring and/or witness testimony
for evidence of the tenant's usage. 13 Application of the primary
residence test as a pure usage assessment-which it becomes
when a tenant undisputedly possesses only one residence-
encourages improper monitoring of persons in their own home
and may open the statute to claims of unconstitutionality for the
violation of a person's fundamental right to privacy in their own
134 See Claridge Gardens, Inc. v. Menotti, 160 A.D.2d 544, 544, 554 N.Y.S.2d
193, 194, (1st Dep't 1990); see also Coronet Props. Co. v. Brychova, 122 Misc. 2d 212,
213-14, 469 N.Y.S.2d 911, 912-13 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1983), affd, 126 Misc.
2d 946, 488 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1984).
135 See, e.g., Sarraf, 132 Misc. 2d 97, 100-01, 503 N.Y.S.2d 513, 515-16.
136 ASS'N FOR NEIGHBORHOOD & Hous. DEV., INC., THE $200,000 STOVE: How
FRAUDULENT RENT INCREASES UNDERMINE NEW YORK'S AFFORDABLE HOUSING 3
(2009), available at http://www.wnyc.org/files/stove-report.pdf.
137 See 164th Bronx Parking, L.L.C. v. City of New York, 20 Misc. 3d 796, 800,
862 N.Y.S.2d 248, 253 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 2008) (stating that if an
administrative code fails to provide "notice of required conduct" or standards to the
person charged with its enforcement, it is unconstitutionally vague, which occurs
when persons of "ordinary intelligence must guess at its meaning" and differ in its
application).
13' For example, in TOA Construction, the majority of the evidence used at trial
came from the testimony of the manager of Tsitsires' building. See TOA Constr. Co.
v. Tsitsires, 54 A.D.3d 109, 119, 861 N.Y.S.2d 335, 342 (1st Dep't 2008) (Andrias, J.,
dissenting). The manager testified to Tsitsires' presence in the apartment and
concerning his viewing of hidden camera video surveillance of the lobby from a
camera specifically installed to monitor Tsitsires, which he had been paid to view by
the landlord. See id. at 119, 861 N.Y.S.2d at 342.
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home.139 In the absence of surveillance evidence, a court would
likely rely on testimonial evidence, which is often ripe with
credibility issues or misperceptions, despite the legislative call
for objective evidence in making primary residence
determinations. For instance, a tenant like Tsitsires who has a
proven phobia of people, who testified to only entering and
leaving the building if nobody was around, and who ignores
knocks on the door, could be subject to eviction from his only
residence because nobody truly knew how much time he actually
spent in the apartment.
140
Use of the Pure Physical Nexus Test, which fails to require a
showing that a tenant possesses more than one residence, cannot
be reconciled with the legislative history, the public policy behind
and the explicit statutory language of the primary residence
requirement, nor is it safe from constitutional attacks on privacy
and due process grounds. When a tenant undisputedly possesses
only one residence, the Pure Physical Nexus Test becomes an
assessment only of how much time a tenant has spent in the
subject dwelling in the preceding year. Accordingly, the primary
residence analysis, which can result in a tenant losing possession
of his only home, depends entirely on whether a court finds the
tenant has spent an adequate amount of time in that residence.
This subjective determination, not governed by any clearly
delineated factors and evidenced either by intrusive or unreliable
sources, violates constitutional guarantees of privacy and due
process, and clearly contradicts the legislative demand for
objectivity in making primary residence determinations.
CONCLUSION
Application of the Pure Physical Nexus Test to determine
primary residence claims cannot be reconciled with the plain
language of the primary residence statutes, legislative history,
public policy, or case precedent. To award landlords possession
on primary residence grounds without requiring proof that a
tenant possesses more than one residence vastly aggrandizes a
landlord's ability to evict beyond the level comprehended by the
139 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (noting that people have
a fundamental right of privacy to be free from surveillance in their homes).
140 See TOA Constr., 54 A.D.3d at 127-28, 861 N.Y.S.2d at 347-48.
[Vol. 83:905
DEFINING PRIMARY RESIDENCE
legislature in enacting this requirement. Moreover, this
standard effectively warps a statute designed to diminish
homelessness into a tool that will create it.
Accordingly, the Initial Burden Test is the proper standard
to employ when assessing primary residence claims. Under this
test, a landlord must first prove that a tenant possesses more
than one residence. Upon satisfaction of this threshold burden,
the landlord must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the subject residence is not the tenant's primary residence
by providing objective evidence that the tenant does not have an
"ongoing, substantial, physical nexus" with the contested
residence "for actual living purposes."141
While an explicit legislative mandate demanding an initial
showing of at least two residences is absent in the primary
residence statutes and regulations, each and every stop in the
traditional path of statutory interpretation bolsters the
conclusion that the legislature deemed it a necessary part of the
primary residence test. While a statutory definition of the term
is absent, the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase "primary
residence," a meaning known and likely intended by the
legislature that crafted the initial primary residence
requirement, clearly connotes a comparison between two
residences before one can be considered primary. Additionally,
the legislative history concerning the addition of the primary
residence requirement reveals that the legislature intended to
limit the scope of the primary residence requirement to persons
thwarting the goals of the rent-regulation system by usurping
the limited supply of affordable rent-regulated housing, when
they clearly had no need as demonstrated from owning more
than one residence. Moreover, the legislature, in initially
focusing on domicile or usage, revealed a simultaneous effort to
limit the scope of the statutes by insulating actual New York
residents from primary residence litigation, despite even the
most extreme underutilization of a tenant's residence.
Delving into the legislative history makes clear that the
public policy behind creating a primary residence requirement
was not meant to be selectively paraphrased. While the
legislature intended to return underutilized housing units to the
141 See Emay Props. Co. v. Norton, 136 Misc. 2d 127, 129, 519 N.Y.S.2d 90, 92
(Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1987).
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market to alleviate the housing shortage in New York,142 it
cannot be ignored that the legislature also had a specific target in
mind to achieve this goal. The legislation was directed at
tenants, who, facing eviction, would not exacerbate the housing
shortage in New York by actually becoming homeless. Moreover,
the legislature most likely would have expressly noted its
willingness to allow for unprecedented judicial decrees of
homelessness somewhere in the statutes, regulations, or
memorandums regarding the primary residence requirement if it
intended this outcome. Lastly, judicial interpretation of the
primary residence requirement prior to TOA Construction has
uniformly demanded, albeit not always in express terms, that a
tenant's only residence is per se their primary residence.
There is simply no support for the notion that there is no
need to prove that a tenant possesses at least two residences
before subjecting him to the possibility of eviction on primary
residence grounds. This idea is both beyond reconciliation with
every traditional means of statutory interpretation and,
moreover, an application of the test in this manner distorts the
primary residence requirement from an innately comparative
test to a purely usage-based test. The resulting reliance on
purely subjective evidence to determine what constitutes
sufficient usage of a tenant's only home raises constitutional
issues of privacy and vagueness, and allows for decisions based
purely on testimonial evidence, which clearly contradicts the
legislative demand for objectivity in primary residence criteria.
Accordingly, the primary residence statute must be interpreted
to demand that a tenant facing eviction on non-primary residence
grounds must possess at least two residences.
If not, the overworked attorney, who works eighty hours a
week, who takes advantage of her firm's "sleeping pods" four
nights a week, who does little but store her possessions in her
apartment, and who has no intention of soon giving up this
lifestyle, may be at risk of losing her only home. She can't be
sure, however, because the primary residence determination,
which centers solely on what constitutes sufficient usage of her
apartment, will be left to the arbitrary perceptions of appropriate
usage of whichever court she happens to be in front of.
142 See supra note 93.
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